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ABSTRACT 
The current paper argues that examining Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein provides a good analogy 
for understanding the current development of the international state-building agenda, 
particularly the underlying principles guiding intervention. In particular, the paper analyzes 
the Enlightenment Project’s quest for progress and perfection and how those ideas still thrive in 
the international organizations involved in post-conflict state-building interventions. The paper 
begins by analyzing the key characteristics underlying the Enlightenment’s search for global 
progress and peace. Subsequently, it identifies how modern international organizations have 
operationalized the principles and assumptions of the Enlightenment to promote world peace, 
particularly emphasizing its relationship to contemporary state-building operations. 
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“Mingled with this horror, I felt the bitterness of disappointment; dreams that had 
been my food and pleasant rest for so long a space were now become a hell to me; 
and the change was so rapid, the overthrow so complete!” (M. SHELLEY, Frankenstein, 
p. 53) 
 
INTRODUCTION 
In a recent reflection on the dynamics of state formation, Oliver Richmond (2014) 
argues that contemporary international state-building endeavors have created hybrid 
political entities that embody both quasi-liberal and authoritarian features. According to 
Richmond, through its post-cold war peacebuilding enterprises, the international community 
seeks to create “good” states modeled on a liberal template that emphasizes the security and 
financial dimensions of the contemporary neoliberal state. However, these endeavors usually 
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encounter significant resistance and incite widespread backlash from the indigenous actors. 
As a result, Richmond (2014, p. 2) employs a common literary analogy to highlight the 
contemporary paradox in which “International statebuilding should produce a ‘good’ state 
(Jekyll) whereas the state’s local contestation produces a predatory or backward state 
(Hyde)”.  
Richmond’s text argues that contemporary state-building endeavors in places such 
as Cambodia, East Timor, Bosnia, Kosovo, Palestine, and Afghanistan have failed to construct 
robust state institutions and deliver on the promise of human development – i.e., they have 
failed to “convert Hyde into Jekyll” (RICHMOND, 2014, p. 4). Instead, international state-
building missions have produced weak institutions which are incapable of promoting 
effective development and governance strategies and inclusive citizenship. According to 
Richmond, the main source of this paradox is the international community’s incapacity to 
encourage and harness the potential of local agency. As a result, “the states being built reflect 
neither local, sociohistorical frameworks for legitimacy nor identity, and so command little 
loyalty.” (RICHMOND, 2014, p. 16). 
The current paper does not dispute the outcomes of recent state-building 
interventions. Many of Richmond’s evaluations and concerns are shared by the author. 
However, the premises of Richmond’s analysis are questioned. In particular, the current 
paper argues that Richmond’s use of Robert Louis Stevenson’s The Strange Case of Dr. Jekyll 
and Mr. Hyde to describe contemporary international state-building endeavors is rather 
misguided. Richmond’s general argument does not fit well with Stevenson’s theme. We can 
frame Richmond’s work in what Belloni (2007) designates as the autonomist approach to 
international intervention. Autonomists are highly critical of exogenous efforts to build state 
capacities and promote a sustainable peace. More precisely, Richmond’s more radical version 
of autonomism views international state-building interventions as subjugating local actors 
due to its “overbearing, perhaps even colonial” approach (RICHMOND, 2011, p. 13) which 
“maintains a global hierarchy and inequality rather than addressing the causes of conflict” 
(RICHMOND, 2013, p. 773). Therefore, Richmond’s critique focuses on the motivations involved 
in state-building as well as the outcomes of the interventions. 
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However, Stevenson’s novella is the unrivaled gothic doppelganger tale of the inner 
human conflict between good and evil. While Henry Jekyll personified the civilized Victorian 
virtues, and Edward Hyde the voracious and evil essence of Man, Jekyll and Hyde were one 
and the same individual. In fact, the book’s central thesis rests on the duality of human nature. 
As Jekyll claimed, “Man is not truly one, but truly two” (STEVENSON, 1964, p. 52). Therefore, 
“good” and “evil” are both intrinsic characteristics of individuals and societies. There is, 
however, no attempt in the story to ever produce any “good” Hyde. Quite the contrary, Jekyll 
delights in sparking Hyde’s mischievous nature: “Men have before hired bravos to transact 
their crimes, while their own person and reputation sat under shelter. I was the first that ever 
did so for his pleasures” (STEVENSON, 1964, p. 56). Physically separating these two distinct 
existences was Jekyll’s ultimate desideratum: 
 
If each, I told myself, could be housed in separate identities, life would be relieved of 
all that was unbearable; the unjust might go his way, delivered from the aspirations 
and remorse of his more upright twin; and the just could walk steadfastly and 
securely on his upward path, doing the good things in which he found his pleasure, 
and no longer exposed to disgrace and penitence by the hands of this extraneous evil. 
It was the curse of mankind that these incongruous faggots were thus bound together 
– that in the agonised womb of consciousness, these polar twins should be 
continuously struggling.  (STEVENSON, 1964, p. 52-53) 
 
Hyde offered Jekyll the freedom to submit to his primordial impulses and derive 
pleasures with virtual impunity. Throughout his life, social expectations had impeded Jekyll 
from indulging in his reckless desires. The development of a potion allowed him to embrace 
his most intimate desires without shame or consequence. And the mischief was indulged by 
Jekyll who “now with the most sensitive apprehensions, now with a greedy gusto, projected 
and shared in the pleasures and adventures of Hyde” (STEVENSON, 1964, p. 60).  
It was only in recognizing that the evil Hyde was overtaking Jekyll that apprehension 
grew. As Jekyll succumbed to ill-health, Hyde exhilarated in life and malice. Even then, 
however, Jekyll admired his alternate existence. Despite Hyde’s disfigurement and less 
developed stature, Jekyll still marveled at the talents and astuteness of Hyde who, in the most 
despairing moments, had the ability to “[rise] to the importance of the moment” (STEVENSON, 
1964, p. 64). Only the assured demise of Jekyll spawned the need to find a definitive solution 
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to this double existence. To permanently vanquish Hyde, Jekyll also had to perish. Ultimately, 
The Strange Case of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde reinforces the worldly belief that “there is a split 
in man’s psyche between ego and instinct, between civilization and ‘nature,’ and the split can 
never be healed” (OATES, 1988, p. 607). This is a far stretch from Richmond’s (2014) account 
of the dynamics of contemporary international state-building. Besides providing a catchy 
title for an article, any resemblance between Stevenson’s literary work and the dynamics of 
contemporary state-building is a matter of chance that does not stand up to rigorous analysis. 
A more appropriate and valuable comparison for understanding the current 
development of the international state-building agenda would be achieved by examining 
Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein, or the Modern Prometheus. Throughout the years Frankenstein 
has been interpreted as an allegory of a plethora of themes. Yet, as Levine (1982, p. 3) has 
pointed out, Frankenstein “has tapped into the center of Western feeling and imagination”. 
In particular, Shelley’s novel provides a vibrant metaphor of Enlightenment thought and the 
limitless ambition of modern reason and rationality. No ambition or venture was impossible 
for the enlightened Dr. Victor Frankenstein. The application of scientific thinking and 
knowledge allowed Frankenstein not only to uncover “the cause of generation and life”, but 
to bestow “animation upon lifeless matter” (SHELLEY, 1963, p. 45-46).   
Similar beliefs and ambitions survive to this day. The following pages will 
demonstrate how the views held by Frankenstein in creating his monster imbue 
contemporary international organizations. An unrelenting confidence in reason and 
rationality drive the vision of progress espoused by these institutions. More precisely, the 
contemporary state-building endeavors, with their achievements and shortfalls, can only be 
effectively understood when we appreciate the underlying principles guiding intervention, 
namely the pursuit of an ideal political entity. Thus, the next section will analyze the 
Enlightenment project’s quest for progress and perfection, highlighting its main ideas. The 
subsequent section will illustrate how the ideas of the philosophes of the Enlightenment still 
thrive in today’s societies and in particular in the international organizations involved in 
post-conflict state-building interventions. Finally, the concluding section offers a reflection 
on the current challenges and future facing international state-building endeavors. 
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FRANKESTEIN AND THE ENLIGHTENMENT’S QUEST FOR PROGRESS  
Frankenstein or The Modern Prometheus was originally published in 1818. It marks 
a transition between the Enlightenment and the Romantic periods.2 While the virtues of the 
natural world, typical of Romanticism, are evident in the novel, Frankenstein echoes many of 
the ideas underlying Enlightenment thought. In particular, it embraces the key assumptions 
of critical rationalism which combines “the application of reason to social, political and 
economic issues with a concern with progress, emancipation and improvement” (HAMILTON, 
1992, p. 20). 
The Enlightenment has been characterized in many different ways throughout the 
past two centuries. However, in its most basic sense it represented “the creation of a new 
framework of ideas about man, society and nature, which challenged existing conceptions 
rooted in a traditional world-view, dominated by Christianity” (HAMILTON, 1992, p. 23). In 
other words, Enlightenment thinkers sought to break with the past and its emphasis on 
tradition, faith, and religious authority. While the philosophes of the Enlightenment focused 
their writings and reflections on different subjects and issues, Peter Hamilton (1992) 
provides a list of core ideas and values which united them under a common “paradigm”: 
 
 Emphasis on the importance of reason and rationality as a way of organizing human 
knowledge; 
 Insistence on empirical facts to validate all forms of knowledge; 
 Reliance on science and the scientific method to produce knowledge; 
 Claim to the universal value of reason and rationality; 
 Belief that progress – i.e., the improvement of the human condition – could be derived 
from the application of science and reason; 
 Prominence of the individual (over the community); 
 Focus on freedom – e.g., beliefs, economic, social; 
                                                          
2 The Enlightenment is generally accepted as the period in European intellectual history spanning from about 
the 1680s to the 1790s (KRAMNICK, 1995), whilst the Romantic era is usually identified with the literary and 
artistic spirit of the first half of the 19th century. 
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 Conviction that the main characteristics of human nature were always the same; 
 Rejection of religious tradition in favor of secular knowledge. 
 
These ideas provided the cornerstone for what many have designated as the Project 
of Modernity – i.e., a deliberate intellectual endeavor aimed at transforming the existing 
institutions of society and creating a new and perfect world (HARVEY, 1992; HABERMAS, 1981). 
Enlightenment philosophes such as Condorcet, Priestley, Turgot, and Voltaire celebrated the 
inevitable march towards unbounded progress and human perfectibility. Mary Shelley’s 
novel mirrors this vision as Dr. Victor Frankenstein, like most of his enlightened 
contemporaries, sought to penetrate the secrets of nature and overcome the limits of 
scientific knowledge of his time. However, Frankenstein’s ambition was nothing less than the 
(re)creation of life: 
 
Under the guidance of my new preceptors I entered with the greatest diligence into 
the search of the philosopher’s stone and the elixir of life; but the latter soon obtained 
my undivided attention. Wealth was an inferior object, but what glory would attend 
the discovery if I could banish disease from the human frame and render man 
invulnerable to any but a violent death!  (SHELLEY, 1963, p. 31).   
 
However, the most distinctive feature of Enlightenment thought is “its immanent 
relation to a criterion of rational validity which acts as a standard against which opinions and 
convictions can be upheld by rational examination” (HONNETH, 1987, p. 693). No longer would 
man be subjected to the whims of tradition and superstition. Quite the contrary. The 
philosophes vigorously sought to abolish and supplant traditional forms of knowledge reliant 
on religious authority, particularly the authority of the Christian churches. The astronomic 
discoveries of Kepler, Copernicus, and Galileo in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth centuries 
provided the scientific and empirical foundations for challenging Christian-based 
cosmologies. Accordingly, science was the supreme form of knowledge and “was the basis for 
an unbounded faith in progress, a belief in perfectibility and the imminent elimination of pain 
and suffering” (KRAMNICK, 1995, p. xiii). Rational scientific laws established by 
experimentation and empirical observation would catalyze human progress.  
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The scientific method could be applied to all aspects of human society. In fact, 
philosophes such as Diderot and D’Alembert believed in the unity of knowledge and sought to 
collect all the cumulative scientific information of their time in their Encyclopédie. By 
applying scientific knowledge, nature could finally be controlled for the benefit of Man 
(HAMILTON, 1992). For instance, science could provide for more efficient and productive 
agriculture, eliminating poverty and famine. It could also contribute to reducing infirmities 
and eradicating diseases. Science could even be employed for industrial purposes, namely by 
inventing new machines and processes which could increase productivity and benefit all of 
society. It should then be of no surprise that Frankenstein’s (re)creation of life resulted from 
careful scientific examination and experimentation. 
Ultimately, the progressive quality of science would help individuals achieve a good 
life. John Locke had long determined that men were relentlessly determined in the “pursuit 
of happiness” (ST. JOHN, 1901, p. 301). The philosophes of the Enlightenment, however, sought 
nothing less than the universal promotion of happiness amongst all individuals and groups 
(ZAFIROVSKI, 2010). From this perspective it follows that nothing could fulfill human 
happiness more than the eradication of conflict and war. Once more, the Enlightenment’s 
faith in human progress anticipated the end of war and the foundation of an era of sustainable 
peace. Unencumbered by the tyranny of tradition and superstition, reason would ultimately 
release societies from the perils of war: 
 
…how truth, in spite of the transient success of prejudices, and the support they 
receive from the corruption of governments or of the people, must in the end obtain 
a durable triumph; by what ties nature has indissolubly united the advancement of 
knowledge with the progress of liberty, virtue, and respect for the natural rights of 
man; how these blessings, the only real ones, though so frequently seen apart as to 
be thought incompatible, must necessarily amalgamate and become inseparable, the 
moment knowledge shall have arrived at a certain pitch in a great number of nations 
at once, the moment it shall have penetrated the whole mass of a great people, whose 
language shall have become universal, and whose commercial intercourse shall 
embrace the whole extent of the globe. This union having once taken place in the 
whole enlightened class of men, this class will be considered as the friends of human 
kind, exerting themselves in concert to advance the improvement and happiness of 
the species. (CONDORCET, 1796, p. 19) 
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Immanuel Kant best articulated this rationale in his Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical 
Essay. According to Kant (1917 [1795]), the establishment of peace requires a conscious 
effort since Man’s natural state is the state of war. In order to surpass this inherent state of 
conflict, Kant identified three definitive articles of peace which would guarantee the 
establishment of a Perpetual Peace: 1) the civil constitution of every state should be 
republican, 2) the law of nations should be founded on a federation of free states, and 3) the 
law of world citizenship should be limited to conditions of universal hospitality. Kant’s first 
two articles are particularly revealing of how we might achieve a state of lasting harmony. To 
begin with, due to its representative character, a state with a republican constitution depends 
on the consent of its citizens for the prosecution on war.3 In other words, when “the consent 
of the subjects is required to determine whether there shall be war or not, nothing is more 
natural than that they should weight the matter well, before undertaking such a bad 
business” (KANT, 1917, p. 122). Furthermore, Kant argues for the foundation of a federation 
of republican states which would guarantee the individual rights of each nation, just as civil 
society guarantees each individual his own rights. However, Kant’s republican federation is 
more than a traditional peace treaty among nations. It is an ever-growing commitment to an 
international system based on the law of common reason:  
 
Hence there must be an alliance of a particular kind which we may call a covenant of 
peace (foedus pacificum), which would differ from a treaty of peace (pactum pacis)  
in this respect, that the latter merely puts an end to one war, while the former would 
seek to put an end to war for ever. (…) The practicability or objective reality of this 
idea of federation which is to extend gradually over all states and so lead to perpetual 
peace can be shewn. For, if Fortune ordains that a powerful and enlightened people 
should form a republic, – which by its very nature is inclined to perpetual peace – 
this would serve as a centre of federal union for other states wishing to join, and thus 
secure conditions of freedom among the states in accordance with the idea of the law 
of nations. (KANT, 1917, p. 234-235) 
 
The Enlightenment idea of a perpetual peace has endured into the Twenty-first 
century in the guise of the Democratic Peace theory. The theory refutes realism and 
                                                          
3 Kant distinguished between a republican and democratic constitution. Providing a conceptual distinction quite 
different from the one employed today, Kant (1917) considered democratic regimes to be necessarily despotic 
due to their emphasis on majority rule. Only republican regimes guaranteed representativeness and by 
separating the executive and legislative powers.  
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neorealism’s assumptions regarding the unregulated competition amongst states. Realists 
and neorealists generally discard the possibility of any meaningful cooperation among states 
due to the anarchic structure of the international system. Some realists, such as Robert Gilpin 
(1984; 1999), do acknowledge that humans require rules for mediating their interactions. 
Consequently, states also require a common set of rules or regimes in order to inform 
interstate behavior. However, at its core, realism embraces the unwavering belief that 
international affairs are conflictual in nature and that power and security are the driving 
motivations of political life (GILPIN, 1984). According to Waltz (1979, p. 105), “Even the 
prospect of large absolute gains for both parties does not elicit their cooperation so long as 
each fears how the other will use its increased capabilities”. Consequently, peace is fleeting 
phenomenon at best. In contrast, the Democratic Peace theory posits that due to the intrinsic 
features of democratic systems, democratic nations tend to show restraint, namely regarding 
the employment of lethal violence, in their interactions with other democracies (DOYLE, 
1983a, 1983b; RUSSETT, 1993). Notwithstanding the criticism, as Jack Levy (1988, p. 662) has 
assertively acknowledged, the fact that democratic nations rarely, if ever, engage in war 
against each other “comes as close as anything we have to an empirical law in international 
relations”. In fact, the Democratic Peace’s theoretical elegance and rational logic has a great 
appeal for society (particularly Western nations), political organizations, and even 
academia.4  
Like the Democratic Peace, the Enlightenment project anchored its vision on political 
liberalism. Only intellectually, politically, and economically free individuals could reach true 
enlightenment and take advantage of their whole potential. As Kant (1995, p. 6) 
acknowledged, “Men work themselves gradually out of barbarity if only intentional artifices 
are not made to hold them in”. Many of the key ideas underlying the Enlightenment’s political 
                                                          
4 While the main assumptions of the Democratic Peace theory are amply accepted and disseminated by many 
policy-makers, organizations, and academics, it has received a considerable degree of contestation. For instance, 
Sebastian Rosato (2003, p. 599) argues that the Democratic Peace is a recent phenomenon and “is in fact an 
imperial peace based on American power”. In a similar vein, while Gates et al. (1996) do not deny a relationship 
between democracy and peace, they do insist that the relationship has not been adequately demonstrated since 
the theory does not adequately identify and explain the causal mechanisms. Christopher Layne (1994) provides 
a more assertive assault on the Democratic Peace theory. As a realist the author emphasizes the anarchic, 
competitive, and self-interested characteristics on international relations, arguing that the Democratic Peace 
theory espoused by liberal theorists is “based on hope, not on fact” (LAYNE, 1994, p. 49). 
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views were presented in John Locke’s Second Treatise of Civil Government published in 1690. 
Locke sought to put forward an account and justification for the restraint of government. He, 
therefore, argued that man’s natural condition is one of “perfect freedom” in which he is free 
to carry out his goals without depending or requiring the consent of any other man. In 
addition, Locke (1971, p. 4) claimed that all individuals were equal, i.e., “born to all the same 
advantages of nature, and the use of the same faculties”. Therefore, men would organize 
themselves politically and surrender some of their liberties only with the sole purpose of 
preserving their own individual livelihood and property. More precisely: 
 
If man in the state of nature be so free, as has been said, if he be absolute lord of his 
own person and possessions, equal to the greatest, and subject to no body, why will 
he part with his freedom, this empire, and subject himself to the dominion and 
control of any other power? To which it is obvious to answer, that though in the state 
of nature he hath such a right, yet the enjoyment of it is very uncertain, and 
constantly exposed to the invasion of others. For all being kings as much as he, every 
man his equal, and the greater part no strict observers of equity and justice, the 
enjoyment of the property he has in this state is very unsafe, very unsecure. This 
makes him willing to quit a condition, which, however free, is full of fears and 
continual dangers; and it is not without reason, that he seeks out, and is willing to 
join in society with others, who are already united, or have a mind to unite, for the 
mutual preservation of their lives, liberties, and estates, which I call by the general 
name, property. (LOCKE, 1971, p. 4).  
 
However, Locke was steadfast in identifying the limits of the commonwealth’s 
authority over the individual. The legislative power, onto which men have yielded their 
natural freedoms, is confined to promoting the “common good”. It does so by establishing 
laws which enshrine the approval of its constituents. In other words, the legislative body is 
chosen and appointed by the enfranchised public who is the ultimate authority and over 
which no law can exist without its consent. Locke further developed his limited conception 
of government in his Letters on Toleration. Here he was particularly critical of any intention 
of the state to infringe on an individual religious beliefs. For, according to Locke (2010), “the 
power of civil government relates only to men’s civil interests, is confined to the care of the 
things of this world, and hath nothing to do with the world to come”. Locke’s writings and 
ideas on liberty provided the rationale for limiting the role of government and the state in 
other areas such as economic activities. Whereas Anne Turgot (1995, p. 504) declared that 
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“all branches of commerce ought to be free, equally free, entirely free”, Adam Smith offered 
an extensive and elaborate reasoning for economic freedom. In An Inquiry into the Nature and 
Causes of the Wealth of Nations, Smith attributes man’s pursuit to satisfy self-interest to 
human nature. Rather than condemning this behavior, Smith argues that an individual’s 
pursuit of economic self-interest can yield greater benefits to the whole society. Statesmen’s 
attempts at regulating individual economic endeavors are counter-productive. Restricting 
freedom of trade is, therefore, prejudicial to a state’s own interests considering that every 
town and country that “opened their ports to all nations, instead of being ruined by this free 
trade, as the principles of the commercial system would lead us to expect, have been enriched 
by it” (SMITH, 1904). 
Accordingly, the Enlightenment’s liberal ideal provided individuals with the 
reasoning and the tools to create a new world of intellectual, political, and economic freedom. 
And just as Frankenstein professed that “A new species would bless me as its creator and 
source; many happy and excellent natures would owe their being to me” (SHELLEY, 1963, p. 
47), so too the philosophes believed that they would be treasured for their genius and their 
gift to mankind. Liberal states would provide the ideal to which all people of world aspire to 
because “till they become civilized, as in the natural progress of things they necessarily must, 
they [the people] will be sufficiently overawed by the superior power of nations that are so” 
(PRIESTLEY, 1791). 
 
OPERATIONALIZING THE ENLIGHTENMENT PROJECT OF WORLD PEACE 
While the Enlightenment as a specific historical period ended with the dawning of 
the Nineteenth century, its main intellectual postulates were disseminated globally and 
survive to this day. New forms of communication were responsible for the spread of 
Enlightenment project. The growing number of regularly published books, journals, and 
newspapers circulated the philosophes ideas (HAMILTON, 1992). These ideas fueled many of 
the innovations we usually associate with Modernity – e.g., capitalism, industrialization, and 
democratization. In particular, Modernity also witnessed the birth and consolidation of the 
modern state.  
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Whereas societies have always organized themselves politically, pre-modern states 
– e.g., empires, city-states, feudal states, absolutist states – differed significantly from their 
modern counterparts. The modern state originated from the European state system founded 
in the Sixteenth century and incorporates several distinctively modern features. More 
specifically, Held (1995) identifies several distinguishing characteristics between the 
modern and pre-modern state. To begin with, the modern state is territorially defined. 
Whereas modern states have borders, pre-modern states had frontiers (GIDDENS, 1985). This 
naturally implies that their administrative capacity was unevenly distributed throughout 
their territory. In contrast, the modern state encompasses a highly concentrated 
administration of all things within its borders. This administrative competence allows for the 
second major innovation of the modern state – i.e., the monopoly of the means of violence. 
The control by the state of the means of coercion was simultaneously the result of the 
pacification of the people and a form of maintaining them internally pacified (TILLY, 1985). In 
addition, the modern state is characterized by an impersonal structure of power. Only when 
the traditional and sometimes overlapping claims to power from religion, tradition, or 
property rights were eliminated could a single impersonal administrative power govern over 
a legally circumscribed territorial jurisdiction. Lastly, the modern state rests on the concept 
of legitimacy. In other words, the state gained its right to govern over its people by giving its 
citizens an active voice in the political process. Therefore, we may conclude that all Modern 
states are “nation states – political apparatuses, distinct from both ruler and ruled, with 
supreme jurisdiction over a demarcated territorial area, backed by a claim to a monopoly of 
coercive power, and enjoying a minimum level of support or loyalty from their citizens” (HELD, 
1995, p. 87). 
However, the modern nation state can only be truly understood in the context of a 
wider system of equivalent political entities. As Giddens (1985, p. 4) suggests, “The internal 
administrative coordination of nation-states from the beginnings depends upon reflexively 
monitored conditions of an international nature”. Thus, over the past two centuries the 
nation state has become the central political actor in the international system. Several factors 
contributed to the consolidation and triumph of the modern nation state in international 
politics. Its capacity to organize and mobilize the means of coercion and economic resources 
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and consolidate its legitimacy as the supreme form of political organization were essential to 
its success: 
 
They won at war because as warfare became more extended in scale and cost, it was 
larger national states which were best able to organize and fund military power; and 
as these states expanded overseas this ability increased. They were economically 
successful because the rapid growth of their economies from the late sixteenth 
century, and particularly after the mid-eighteenth century, sustained the process of 
capital accumulation: as the economic basis of the centralized state expanded, it 
significantly reduced the war-making ability of smaller states (often with fragmented 
power structures) and traditional empires (which depended above all on coercive 
power for their success). And they gained legitimacy because as they   extended their 
military, organizational and coordinating activities, they came to depend more and 
more on the active cooperation, collaboration and support of their peoples, 
especially well-organized civil groups. (HELD, 1995, p. 103-104). 
 
As mentioned above, the global diffusion of the modern nation state is at the heart of 
the contemporary quest to promote a liberal peace (RICHMOND, 2008). Inspired by the 
Enlightenment project’s confidence in building a better world, efforts to create and 
strengthen liberal states have pressed forward since the post-war era. Despite some setbacks 
in the second half of the Twentieth century, the liberal ideal gained a renewed emphasis after 
the Cold War ended as many prophesized that the end of history had arrived and that no 
other ideology was in a position to challenge liberal democracy or the legitimacy of popular 
sovereignty (FUKUYAMA, 1992). Therefore, just as Frankenstein sought to create a greater 
being in his image, so too do liberal states and the international community seek to fashion 
other states in the semblance of their ideal model. In particular, the international 
community’s increasing concern with issues of governance has led to the new emphasis on 
international state-building. International state-building refers to the actions carried out by 
international organizations to (re)create, restructure, or strengthen the governmental 
institutions of a state (CALL & COUSENS, 2008; PARIS & SISK, 2009). In the long run, the 
contemporary state-building project espoused by the international community seeks to 
create a sustainable peace by promoting liberal institutions and practices (WESTERN, 2012).  
While the practice of state-building has a long lineage, the 1992 the United Nations 
(UN) report An Agenda for Peace issued by Secretary General Boutros-Ghali paved the way 
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for a new perspective on promoting international peace and stability. In order to effectively 
curtail conflict and war the report emphasized the need to address many of the sources of 
conflict, namely economic despair, social injustice, and political oppression. Accordingly, the 
UN’s report envisioned a wide assortment of tools at the disposal of the international 
community to achieve these goals: peace-keeping, peace-making, and post-conflict peace-
building. In particular, An Agenda for Peace placed a fresh emphasis on strengthening states’ 
capabilities to “balance between the needs of good internal governance and the requirements 
of an ever more interdependent world” (BOUTROS-GHALI, 1992). The latter was particularly 
relevant to the post-Cold War world due to its focus on the rebuilding of the institutions and 
infrastructures of post-conflict nations. As Paris and Sisk (2009, p. 5) argue, “peacebuilding 
in its post-conflict form became the UN’s principal peace and security activity after the Cold 
War”. 
State-building has come to assume an ever-greater role in the international 
community’s peace-building agenda. Without the political constraints inherent in the bipolar 
Cold War confrontation, numerous multi-lateral state-building operations have been 
organized and carried out throughout the globe in the last three decades. These initiatives 
have sought to tackle the conventional assumptions regarding the root causes of 
international conflict, i.e., state weakness and failure. And just as Victor Frankenstein 
understood that “To examine the causes of life, we must first have recourse to death” 
(SHELLEY, 1963: p. 44), international organizations have also devoted considerable resources 
to identifying the causes and consequences of state weakness and failure. While there is some 
dispute as to how to define weak and failed states, we can identify some common features 
that are strongly associated with them such as economic malperformance, lack of social 
synergy, authoritarianism, militarism, and environmental degradation (GROS, 1996). The 
terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 placed failed states at the heart of the global security 
agenda (CALL, 2008b; FUKUYAMA, 20014; ZOELLICK, 2009). In particular, weak and failed states 
have been identified as the source of many of the world’s most serious problems. Due to their 
lack of capacity and will, they pose multiple threats to the international community such as 
terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), transnational criminality, 
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pandemics and global health issues, energy insecurity, and regional degeneration (PATRICK, 
2006). 
However, by identifying weak and failed states it assumes that there are “normal” or 
“successful” states. As Charles Call (2008b, p. 1494) has pointed out, the concept of state 
failure “contains culturally specific assumptions about what a ‘successful’ state should look 
like”. Therefore, if weak and failed states are defined as political entities that are either 
unable or unwilling to provide certain fundamental political goods, then it goes without 
question that state–building should direct its energies to (re)creating, restructuring, or 
strengthening the governmental institutions of a state and enable them to provide the crucial 
political goods traditionally associated with statehood. In other words, international state-
building endeavors to give life to lifeless polities and establish modern liberal states in their 
place.  
Considering that a state embodies the exercise of power by imposing order on a 
specific territory (CALL, 2008a; SPRUYT, 2007), the liberal state provides a template for what 
the international community aspires to accomplish. More precisely, the modern liberal state 
reveals several characteristic features (PIERSON, 2004). Some of these elements have been 
previously presented above – e.g., monopoly of the means of violence, territoriality, internal 
and external sovereignty, rule of law, constitutionality, and legitimacy. The latter is 
particularly relevant because, while all regimes claim to be legitimate, the liberal state 
emphasizes its commitment to democratic institutions and processes through citizenship. In 
fact, according to some scholars, there can be no democracy without the existence of the state. 
As Linz and Stepan (1996, p. 28) have pointed out, “Without a state, there can be no 
citizenship; without citizenship, there can be no democracy”. Democracy is also understood 
as an essential feature of the modern liberal state since it is one of the principal means of 
limiting state power (LAKE, 2010). We should recall the importance Locke and other 
philosophes placed on limiting government involvement in an individuals’ pursuit of 
happiness. However, whereas citizenship guarantees individuals with certain rights, it also 
is complimented by obligations where the individual must also comply with and carry out 
the will of the state.  
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An additional characteristic of the modern state is the existence of a public 
bureaucracy. These highly hierarchical and specialized organizations allow the state to 
maintain administrative control and provide political goods. Bureaucracies were also 
features of pre-modern states. Nevertheless, the scale and breadth of the modern 
bureaucracy is unrivaled since it exercises authority over most aspects of human life. Max 
Weber pointed to the overbearing role bureaucracy played in democratic regimes. For Weber 
(1991, p. 224) bureaucracies were particularly well-suited for democracies due to their 
distinctive focus on “the abstract regularity of the execution of authority, which is a result of 
the demand for ‘equality before the law’ in the personal and functional sense – hence, of the 
horror of ‘privilege,’ and the principled rejection of doing business ‘from case to case’”. This 
bureaucratic element of the modern state is a key component in supplying a host of other 
public goods typical of liberal democracies such as sound management of public finances, 
investment in human capital, provision of infrastructure services, formation of a market, 
management of public assets, and effective public borrowing (GHANI & LOCKHART, 2008). 
These elements serve as the reference for a “successful” state and guide international 
organizations in their state-building initiatives. More precisely, these features provide the 
international community with the key elements of the standard quick-fix state-building 
blueprint employed in strengthening weak states and (re)building failed states (OTTAWAY, 
2002; SUHRKE, 2007; WESLEY, 2008). By assuming that all states should possess the same basic 
features and perform similar functions, international state-building operations converge on 
several key activities (DOBBINS ET AL, 2007; OTTAWAY, 2002; ZOELLICK, 2009). These initiatives 
tend to focus on three dimensions of the state: security, political, economic. Establishing a 
safe and secure environment through peacekeeping (e.g., disarmament, demobilization, and 
reintegration), law enforcement, and/or security sector reform is a critical factor in the initial 
stages of state-building. On many occasions, guaranteeing security also involves providing 
humanitarian aid, namely by responding to imminent epidemics, famine, and lack of shelter 
and dealing with the return of refugees. 
Measures aimed at political restructuring and reform are particularly standard. In 
the attempt to create liberal institutions and practices international state-builders strive to 
swiftly establish a legal and constitutional framework for elections. This inevitably involves 
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promoting a system based on the rule of law and in which the institutional and procedural 
elements characteristic of democratic regimes are guaranteed. The task is complex and 
involves, according to Marina Ottaway, a wide assortment of concurrent and complementary 
reforms such as: 
 
…elected parliaments must be strengthened, and so must executive agencies; the 
judiciary must be built up into an independent body; organizations of civil society 
must be supported financially and provided with training so they will become more 
effective advocates for policy reform; and political parties must learn how they can 
correct their deficiencies. In other words, rule of law must be instituted with all its 
institutional and procedural elements, which include “a representative government 
in which the executive is accountable to the elected legislature or to the electorate; 
the duty of the government to act in compliance with the constitution and the law; a 
clear separation of between the state and political parties; accountability of the 
military and the police to civilian authorities; consideration and adoption of 
legislation by public procedure; publication of administrative regulations as the 
condition for their validity; effective means of redress against administrative 
decisions and provisions of information to the person affected on the remedies 
available; an independent judiciary; protection of the independence of legal 
practitioners; and detailed guarantees in the area of criminal procedure”. (OTTAWAY, 
2002, p. 1006-1107) 
 
Political initiatives also encompass strengthening the states governance functions, 
i.e., the multiple institutional means of coordinating and creating collective social rules and 
providing public goods (BÖRZEL & RISSE, 2010). The restoration of public administration and 
the (re)establishment of basic public services such as transportation, power, water, health, 
and education are particularly important for the international community. The economic 
measures promoted by the international community are directly related with a state’s 
governance role. In particular, the sound management of public finances is considered 
indispensable for a state to be able to carry out its objectives and provide for its citizens.  
Moreover, the international community also insists on macroeconomic policies which it 
deems most appropriate for promoting economic growth and development. Several policies 
are commonly endorsed such as stabilization of the national currency, control of inflation, 
reform of the banking system, and formation of a market through the liberalization of 
commercial activities and the promotion of private enterprise (GHANI & LOCKHART, 2008). The 
emphasis placed on these three key areas is essential to (re)building the legitimacy of the 
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state. As the former president of the World Bank, Robert Zoellick (2009), stated, the 
legitimacy of a state is determined by its performance, namely its capacity to deliver the basic 
public goods demanded by society. 
Just as the Enlightenment philosophes highlighted the value of specialized knowledge 
based on scientific inquiry, so too does the international community’s state-building project 
exhibit a technical veneer. In much the same fashion as Priestley (1791) presaged Burke that 
“The empire of reason will ever be the reign of peace”, the international community employs 
the technocratic tools at its disposal to allegedly build “successful” states and sponsor a 
sustainable global peace. Embodied in the spirit of Enlightenment rationalism, the 
international community reveals great confidence in the power of reason and technical 
knowledge based on precisely formulated rules and techniques. For the technocrats of today 
share the Enlightenment’s emphasis on solving problems based on a scientific approach to 
problem analysis, policy formulation, and policy implementation. This technical knowledge 
is valued due to the appearance of certainty it acquires by being codified through the 
formulation of rules, principles, and maxims which are easily transferable (OAKESHOTT, 1991). 
Thus, by adopting this problem-solving approach, the technocrats involved in designing and 
implementing state-building operations acts much like a policy engineer which, according to 
Michael Oakeshott (1991, p. 9) “is controlled throughout by the appropriate technique and 
whose first step is to dismiss from his attention everything not directly related to his specific 
intentions”.  
The technocratic approach espoused by the international community is assumed to 
be value-free and objective (CENTENO, 1993; OAKESHOTT, 1991). This semblance of neutrality 
is the ultimate power of contemporary technocratic knowledge since, as Mac Ginty (2012, p. 
291) points out, “technocratic approach[es] to peacebuilding posit that scientific and rational 
approaches to dispute resolution are superior as they are not influenced by arbitrary or 
potentially discriminatory decision-making based on historical bias or identity claims”. In 
other words, by espousing policy “solutions” formulated on legal-rational and evidence-
based approaches, the international community’s interventions are believed to be free of the 
distortions inherent in politics. More importantly, by embodying a rationalist outlook, the 
technocratic approach assumes that there is a “perfect” solution to any problem. In his 
502 
Conjuntura Global, vol. 5 n. 3, set./dez, 2016, p. 484-511 
reflection on rationalism in politics, Oakeshott (1991) has detailed the long-standing fixation 
of rationalists in employing reason to the assessment of political issues and their persistent 
quest for policy standardization. His writings, while posing a devastating critique to the main 
tenets of Enlightenment thought, seamlessly highlight the spirit of the rationalist philosophes 
still enduring today: 
 
And the “rational” solution for any problem is, in its nature, the perfect solution. 
There is no place in his scheme for a “best in the circumstances”, only a place for “the 
best”; because the function of reason is precisely to surmount circumstances. (…) 
And from this politics of perfection springs the politics of uniformity: a scheme which 
does not recognize circumstances can have no place for variety. There must in the 
nature of things be one best form of government which all intellects, sufficiently 
roused from the slumber of savage ignorance, will be irresistibly incited to approve 
(…) there may not be one universal remedy for all political ills, but the remedy for 
any particular ill is as universal in its application as it is rational in its conception. 
(OAKESHOTT, 1991, p. 10) 
 
This technocratic vision has permeated the main institutions of contemporary state-
building. In particular, international organizations such as the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Organization for Security and Co-
operation in Europe (OSCE), UN, and World Bank are the core instruments of international 
technocratic governance. This trend towards technocratic approaches to state-building was 
enhanced by the demise of the Cold War and the new focus on peace-building. Several 
documents drafted by international organizations have accentuated the technical élan of 
these interventions. The fact that in An Agenda for Peace mechanisms such as peace-keeping 
were considered “techniques” naturally implied an obligation for “timely and accurate 
knowledge of the facts” and a “new requirement for technical assistance” (BOUTROS-GHALI, 
1992). Since then, according to Mac Ginty (2012), a host of other official documents and 
initiatives have consecrated the technocratic approach to international state-building 
interventions is post-conflict situations – e.g., An Agenda for Development (BOUTROS-GHALI, 
1994), Supplement to an Agenda for Peace (BOUTROS-GHALI, 1995), the establishment of the 
Peace-building Commission (1995), Agenda for Democratization (BOUTROS-GHALI, 1996), the 
Brahimi Report (BRAHIMI, 2000), the establishment of The High Level Panel on Threats, 
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Challenges and Change (2004), Kofi Annan’s report In Larger Freedom (ANNAN, 2005), and 
the Review of the UN Peace-building Architecture (2010). 
International organizations, such as those identified above, are highly complex 
bureaucratic institutions that are increasingly involved in making rules and prescribing the 
behavior of states (BARNETT & FINNEMORE, 2004; RITZER, 2008). The authority and power of 
these international organizations derives from an assortment of inter-related and 
complementary sources. To begin with, the technical and depoliticized claim of these 
bureaucratic organizations provide them with a tremendous amount of authority. As Barnett 
and Finnemore (2004, p. 23) state that, international organizations “frequently claim to be 
the representative of the community’s interests or the values of the international 
community”. Who exactly is the international community and what their precise interests are 
tend not to be a matter of intense debate. Another claim to authority stems from the 
organizations’ expert status. Most international organizations provide specialized 
knowledge and services in one or more policy areas. The complexity involved in problem-
solving and policy formulation favors institutions that possess a significant amount of 
technical information and professional personnel able to generate knowledge and feasible 
policy options from it. 
As mentioned above, the emphasis on technical knowledge and criteria, also affords 
international organizations the power to regulate the behavior of states. Three mechanisms 
intrinsic to these organizations are particularly important in this aspect: 1) the classification 
of the world, 2) the fixation of meaning, and 3) the articulation and diffusion of norms 
(BARNETT & FINNEMORE, 2004). More accurately, international organizations organize and 
classify information and knowledge. For decades, international organizations have been 
active in classifying countries in terms of their political, economic, social, and environmental 
performance. For instance, every year the World Bank monitors and provides a List of Fragile 
and Conflict Affected Situation Countries, determining which states are “fragile”. In a similar 
fashion, the IMF also regularly surveys fragile states in accordance with their capacity to 
deliver on many of the public goods identified above.5 However, by classifying countries 
                                                          
5 For examples see http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/fragilityconflictviolence/overview#1 and 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/survey/so/2015/pol070115a.htm.  
504 
Conjuntura Global, vol. 5 n. 3, set./dez, 2016, p. 484-511 
international organizations are also able to attribute meaning by “framing” the situation. This 
capacity to frame issues and events allow international organizations “to fashion a shared 
understanding of the world, to galvanize sentiments as a way to mobilize and guide social 
action, and to suggest possible resolutions to current plights” (BARNETT & FINNEMORE, 2004, 
p. 33). Thus, states classified as “weak” or “failed” are deemed a threat to international 
security and, consequently, require “fixing”. And as we have discussed above “fixing” states 
necessary implies implementing the standard state-building template formulated and 
promulgated by these same institutions. In this sense, while Barnett and Finnemore (2004, 
p. 33) argue that international institutions are the contemporary equivalents of missionaries, 
their “notion of progress” and “idea of how to create a better life” also echo the spirit of the 
Enlightenment. 
 
CONCLUDING THOUGHTS 
In recent years several scholars and commentators have pronounced the death of 
the contemporary international state-building project. Many believe that “the obsession with 
weak states was always more of a mania than a sound strategic doctrine” (MAZARR, 2014, p. 
113). Besides the emergence of new challenges to the international community, the 
shortcomings of many of the international organization’s state-building operations have 
tempered some of the initial enthusiasm in favor of intervening in war-torn states.  
As stated in the introduction, the author shares many of the concerns of the critics of 
contemporary state-building. It is true, as several critics have highlighted, that the 
international community reveals a tendency to repeat the same mistakes due to the recurrent 
employment of “an unimaginative, uncritical, and template-driven approach to state-
building” (KAPLAN, 2010, p. 89). Few would question the fact that the technocratic patina of 
state-building is deceptive and that the judgments regarding international intervention are 
always the result of political considerations and decisions (WESLEY, 2008). It is also 
undeniable that the international community’s emphasis on technocracy seeks to create a 
politically homogenous world (MAC GINTY, 2012). However, rather than merely faulting the 
international community, it is much more important to understand the ideas driving their 
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behavior. For, while acknowledging that there has been too much optimism regarding the 
capacity to (re)build states, this spirit will not be moderated in the near future. Optimism is 
an essential feature of Enlightenment thought. Therefore, the international community will 
continue to actively seek to create a sustainable peace by promoting liberal institutions. This 
is especially true because initiatives involving internal state reconstruction have not 
produced the outcomes it desires – i.e., democratic regimes (OTTAWAY, 2002; KARL, 1990). Nor 
will the international community “give war a chance” as some academics have provocatively 
proposed (LUTTWAK, 1999). 
The current paper argues that Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein presents itself as an 
exceptional analogy for understanding and appreciating the current state-building dilemma. 
The novel highlights the Enlightenment’s optimism and faith in reason. In particular, it calls 
attention to the implications of the unconstrained belief in freedom and individual self-
realization. As Thomas Vargish (2009, p. 336) clarifies, Frankenstein’s power “appears to be 
inseparable from the freedom to achieve it and this freedom depends upon the ability to 
conceive of oneself as socially unfettered, a free creative spirit, someone paradoxically 
licensed to transgress ethical boundaries in the name of social progress”. However, due to its 
Romantic inspiration, Shelley also attests to the limits of rationality and the power of human 
emotion. Victor Frankenstein ultimately rejects his creation. Rather than a superior being, 
Frankenstein regarded his endeavor as a failure. Disgusted by the results of his experiment 
he forsakes the creature. That is not to say that the international community forsakes the 
countries in which it intervenes. However, Richmond (2014) is correct in claiming that the 
international community does fear the results of the indigenous forces of state formation (i.e., 
a Hyde persona). 
Hence, we might yet gain a lesson from Richmond’s cherished Jekyll and Hyde. Whilst 
the analogy regarding the current predicament of international state-building is flimsy, Dr. 
Jekyll does embody a key element of modern rationalist thought – i.e., the unwavering belief 
in human capacity to move beyond the unknown. More precisely, even knowing that Hyde 
personified evil, Jekyll never questioned the moral implications of his experiment. Rather, in 
failing to control his transformations prior to his demise, he faulted the ingredients used in 
his potion for his unsavory situation. More precisely, faced with imminent death, Jekyll 
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confessed, “I am now persuaded that my first supply was impure, and that it was this 
unknown impurity which lent efficacy to the draught” (STEVENSON, 1964, p. 68). Thus, Jekyll 
does not question his ultimate intention, but rather the means in achieving them.  
In a similar vein, even the most critical voices of contemporary state-building denote 
similar persuasions. For most of these critics target the instruments and means of the 
interventions, not the desired outcome. Seth Kaplan’s (2010) condemnation of international 
state-building is illustrative of this fact. While placing considerable responsibility on the 
international community for the failure of contemporary state-building operations and the 
ensuing chaos, he, nevertheless, espouses the Enlightenment Project’s ultimate aim – the 
establishment of a liberal peace. For Kaplan and other critics, empower local actors and 
strengthen traditional local structures and peace will come. More precisely, “Over time, 
greater trade, education, urbanization, and wealth would break down the barriers between 
clans while transforming traditional systems of governance into more Westernized forms, 
but such a process would be internally driven and shaped by the needs of the local 
population, not those of the international community” (KAPLAN, 2010, p. 91). Critics’ calls for 
endogenously-driven development are truly generous. Yet, self-enlightenment was the 
philosophes final goal. We may celebrate the many criticisms of state-building put forward by 
academics and commentators over the last two decades. However, if their denunciation only 
focuses on the means and the mechanisms of international state-building and not on its final 
objective, we can be sure the Enlightenment’s project of creating a global liberal peace will 
live on for the foreseeable future.  
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